To what extent was propaganda the main reason for the Nazi consolidation of power, 1933–1934?

This investigation examines the extent to which propaganda was the main reason for the Nazi consolidation of power between 1933 and 1934. The first source, a 1934 speech by Joseph Goebbels, is valuable for showing how the regime wished to present itself¹, but its purpose as public propaganda limits its reliability² as evidence of what ordinary Germans actually believed. Historians such as Ian Kershaw argue that terror and legal manoeuvring³ were at least as important as propaganda in securing Nazi control. The Reichstag Fire Decree of February 1933 suspended civil liberties and allowed the regime to arrest thousands of political opponents⁴, which suggests that coercion, not persuasion, drove the earliest stage of consolidation. Propaganda undoubtedly amplified the regime's message⁵, yet the evidence indicates it worked alongside legal and coercive measures rather than acting as the single decisive factor. Reflecting on this investigation, I found that the historian must weigh sources whose origin and purpose make them persuasive but partial⁶, such as speeches designed to mobilise an audience rather than to record events.